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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN TORT*
EDWIN M. BORCHARD
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
It is when we come to the municipal corporation as an agency of
the public power that we find the greatest confusion to prevail, not only
as to the substantive liability or immunity of the 'corporation in tort,
but as to the grounds upon which the liability or immunity, as the
case may be, properly rests. In few, if any, branches of the law have
the courts labored more abjectly under the supposed inexorable domi-
nation of formulas, phrases and terminology, with the result that facts
have often been tortured into the framework of a formula, lacking in
many cases any sound basis of reason or policy. This is notably the
case in the effort to apply the supposedly settled rule that the muni-
cipal corporation is not liable for torts committed by its agents in the
performance of governmental, political or public functions, whereas
it is liable when the tort is committed in the performance of corporate,
private or ministerial functions. Not all courts, however, are equally
submissive to the commands of a ritual; so that we find the utmost
confusion among the courts in the attempt to classify particular acts
of state agents as governmental or corporate. Disagreement among
the courts as to many customary municipal acts and functions may
almost be said to be more common than agreement and the elaboration
of the varying justifications for their classification is even less satis-
fying to any demand for principle in the law. Indeed, so hopeless did
the effort of the courts to make an appropriate classification of func-
tions appear to the Supreme Court of South Carolina that they deter-
mined to abandon the distinction between governmental and corporate
acts.1 1 7 But instead of holding the municipality liable in tort in all
cases, as the late Judge Wanamaker of the Ohio Supreme Court
recently suggested as desirable,18 the South Carolina court decided to
* Continued from the November number, 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1-45.
'In Irvine v. Town of Greenwood (1911) 89 S. C. 5rI, 72 S. E. 228, the court
said: "The confusion which has resulted from the refinements and distinctions
attempted by other courts with respect to the liability of municipal corporations
for torts committed by officers or employees is so great that it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to deduce from them a rule which could be applied with confi-
dence by the public or the bar." Of course a special statute may impose
liability, Burnett v. City of Greenville (1917) io6 S. C. 255, 91 S. E. 2o;
6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1913) sec. 2623.
' Wanamaker, J.,. in his opinion concurring in the result in Fowler v. City of
Cleveland (1919) IOO Ohio St 158, 176, 126 N. E. 72, 77, where, overruling a
long-established line of authority, the city was held liable for injuries to one who
was injured by a negligently driven fire-engine returning from a fire, said:
[12g]
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hold the city immune in all cases, standing in this respect alone among
the states. Judge Foote in the case of Lloyd v. New York,1
89 com-
monly regarded as a leading case, after announcing the time-honored
formula,9 0 came to the discouraging conclusion that there was no
guiding rule for the courts and that "all that can be done with safety
is to determine each case as it arises." In the light of such confession
of lack of principle, it is not surprising that judicial utterances are
irreconcilable and that the effort to determine the law governing the
liability of municipal corporations in tort resolves itself into a study
of local arbitrariness in the different jurisdictions, thereby justifying
a challenge against all the formulas, phrases and terminology under
the control of which the courts profess to be acting. If consistency in
the law is necessary to give it prestige, as Judge Learned Hand has
recently remarked,' 9' then this branch of the law is greatly in need of
reform.
PRINCIPLES
It was natural that with the development of industry there should
come a concentration of population in cities and that with the necessary
growth in governmental functions, decentralization in administration
'The whole doctrine of immunity given to a sovereign state was based upon
the assumption of the divine right of kings-a king can do no wrong; he is
infallible; or, if he do wrong, no subject has any right to complain. This
doctrine has been shot to death on so many different battlefields that it would
seem utter folly now to resurrect it." While the sentiment is commendable and
the result just, it is to be feared that the doctrine has far more vitality than
Judge Wanamaker assumes; (see COMMENTS [1920] 29 Y.LE LAW JOURNAL, 911)
and recently Mr. Justice Holmes has sought to prolong its life by a process of
reasoning that appears to have escaped its earlier and less learned or logical
devotees. He states that the immunity of a sovereign from suit and liability
rests upon no "formal conception, or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which that right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank (19o7)
205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527. We shall have occasion hereafter to
examine this theory. Whatever the correct theory, whether it dictates liability
or immunity, there is no reason why a modern community should not concede
its subjection to legal rules of liability, as the countries of Europe have done for
decades. The Fowler case was overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court, Wana-
maker, J. dissenting, in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown (1922) io6 Ohio St. 342,
14o N. E. 164.
(i85) 5 N. Y. *369, *375.
'"_A municipal corporation, says Judge Foote, "possesses two kinds of powers:
one governmental and public, and to the extent that they are held and exercised,
is clothed with sovereignty; the other private, and to the extent that they are
held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for
public purposes; the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the
former the corporation is a municipal government, and while in the exercise of the
latter is a corporate legal individual." See also extracts from Maximilian v. New
York (1875) 62 N. Y. i6o, 164, and Denver v. Davis (i9o6) 37 Colo. 370, 373,
86 Pac. lO27, lO28, quoted by McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 187, sec. 2625.
' Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 284 Fed. 89o.
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should be a consequence. The English conception of local self-
government, which was adopted in the United States, was not
based on any clear-cut distinction of central from local business. 19 2
Aside from the boroughs, the English local areas, like the coun-
ties, towns and school districts in many of our states to-day, were not
until very lately considered corporations, but merely local administrative
subdivisions of the central authority or state. In the United States,
on the. other hand, the towns and cities were ificorporated at a com-
paratively early day, like the cities of continental Europe. One of the
main purposes of such incorporation, in the light of the common-law
notion of the non-suability of unincorporated bodies,'19 3 was to make
these local bodies subjects of private law, enabling them to own
property and to sue and be sued. While: they were still under strong
control by the state legislatures, their growth in population, number
and political power gradually brought about a greater constitutional
freedom from centralized control and a larger measure of autonomy
in local matters, until to-day, under modem state constitutions and
charters, our cities possess perhaps most of the powers of government
within their territorial jurisdiction.
Yet, while autonomous in many respects, the city is still for some
purposes an agent of the state. How sound in theory this segregration
of function as an agency of state government now is may be* cues-
tioned, although its historical basis is not subject to doubt. At all
events, the assumed dual character of the city as an autonomous cor-
poration and as an agent of the state has served to create the distinction,
not without some justification, between the corporate and the govern-
mental activity of the city and in the first case its suability and respon-
sibility, as in the case of any other corporation, and in the second its
immunity from responsibility if not from suit, as a participant and
sharer in the sovereign character of the state which it represents.
Courts have no difficulty in the first case in regarding the city as a
public service corporation of an advanced type, but seem in the second
case to find an insuperable obstacle to such recognition in the ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit-although it is believed that
the distinction for the most part no longer has any substantial basis.
The lack of any sound foundation for the distinction would seem to
be admitted by our courts, in practice if not in theory, for otherwise
it would be difficult to account for the maze of contrarie.ty which marks
the judicial effort to classify particular functions as governmental or
corporate. Professor Beale's attempted classification of the activities
Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule (1916) 99.
"'In the case of labor unions, the Supreme Court appears to be abandoning this
ancient fetish, which, it is believed, other legal systems never adopted. United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1921) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct 570,COmmENTs (1922) 32 YAsx LAw JouRNAL, 59. See the suggestive article
of Wesley A. Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924)
33 ibid. 383.
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of a municipality into governmental, municipal and commercial, 19 does
not, it is believed, greatly aid in bringing order out of confusion. Yet
the distinction cannot be regarded as purposeless, for it has been applied
on the continent of Europe for decades to distinguish those functions
of government which are designed for the general welfare, like legis-
lation, the administration of justice, military, naval and police protec-
tion, from those which are more especially commercial or which a
private corporation might well perform, such as the operation of rail-
roads, waterworks, gas and electric plants and similar enterprises.
Until recently, when a tendency to minimize the distinction as one of
degree only, has been noticeable, it served to determine in several
countries the principle of the responsibility of the state for the torts
of its officers, not being applied to cities alone, as with us, but more
logically to all political communities, from the largest, the state, to the
smallest, the village, acting as repositories of the public power as
agents of the people. The immunity from public responsibility for
torts on the continent depends, therefore, in principle, upon the nature
of the function, and not as with us, in addition, upon the size of the
group, state, county or city, which is sued. When it is recalled that
both city and state as public corporations are collective names for
human beings associated in political organization for the purpose of
managing their common affairs, the sharp and apparently vital distinc-
tion we make in their respective legal responsibility seems unjustified.
But of this more will be said hereafter.
In the effort to distinguish governmental from corporate functions
of municipal corporations, the courts have drawn in aid various criteria
6r justifications which seemed to them controlling or persuasive. Thus,
aside from the argument derived from the sovereign immunity of the
city as agent of the state, the immunity has been placed on the ground
that the city derives no pecuniary benefit from the exercise of public
functions ;195 that in the performance of public governmental duties
the officers are agents of the state and not of the city, and that there-
fore the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply;196 that cities
' NoTzs (1912) 25 HARv. L. REv. 646; Beale, Cases on Municipal Corporations,
(igII) .6oi.
"Hill v. Boston (1877) 122 Mass. 344. 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th
ed. 1p11) sec. 1642. Pecuniary profit seemed to be the material fact, (not altogether
warranted, it is believed) to impose liability for negligent operation of gas works
in Scott v. Mayor of Manchester (1857, Exch.) 2 H. & N. 204, by Cockburn,
C. J. See Paterson v. Erie Railroad Co. (i9og) 78 N. J. L. 592, 75 At. 922.
4 Dillon, op. cit., secs. 1634, 166o.
'Burrill v. Augusta (1886) 78 Me. II8, 3 At. 177, and the many cases cited
by Dillon, op. cit. supra note I95, sec. 1655. Judge Dillon's exAaustive criteria
as to when the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable and, when not, assumes
too much of his conclusion in his premises and for that reason is not believed to
be helpful in deciding particular cases. It is, however, a fairly correct synthesis
of the involved reasoning and vague criteria which the courts advance from time
to time as alleged justifications for their decisions. Dillon presets the following
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cannot properly perform their functions if they are made liable for
the torts of their employees ;197 that the city should not be liable for
negligence in the performance of duties imposed upon it by the legis-
lature, but only in the case of those voluntarily assumed under gen-
eral powers ;198 that in determining whether or not to undertake an
act the function is governmental, but the execution of the decision in
practice is corporate or ministerial ;l99 that powers exercised for the
benefit of the public at large are governmental, but those conferred
for its own benefit and by reason of its nature as a municipal corpora-
tion are corporate.
2 0 0
as a criterion to determine when the municipal corporation is liable for the acts
of servants or agents:
"If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge
of their duties, can continue or remove them, can hold them responsible for the
manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to theexercise of corporate powers, and are for the peculiar benefit of the corporation
in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants,
and the maxim of respondeat superior applies. But if, on the other hand, they are
elected or appointed by the corporation, in obedience to the statute, to perform
a public service, not peculiarly local or corporate, but because this mode of selec-
tion has been deemed expedient by the legislature in the distribution of the powers
of the government, if they are independent of the corporation as to the tenure of
their office and the manner of discharging their duties, they are not to be
regarded as the servants or agents of the corporation, for whose acts or negligence
it is impliedly liable, but as independent public or state officers with such powers
and duties as the statute confers upon-them, and the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not applicable."
This definition is so broad and loose that it might be deemed to support a
decision either way with respect to most officers, e. g., policemen, firemen, health
officers, street sweepers, ash cart drivers, court officers, and others.
'Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals (181o) 7 Mass. 187; Coolidge v.
Brookline (1874) 114 Mass. 596; Hamilton County Commissioners v. Mighels
(1857) 7 Ohio St. lO9; 3 Abbott, Municipal Corporations (19o6) sec. 963;
Cooley, Municipal Corporations (1914) sec. iIS. This is sometimes expressed in
the form that public moneys raised by taxation for public use cannot lawfully
be applied to the liquidation of damages caused by the torts of officers. Analogy
is drawn from the law governing charitable trusts,
'"Bigelow v. Randolph (i86o, Mass.) 14 Gray 541; City of Freeport v. Isbel
(1877) 83 Ili. 44o; Dickinson v. Boston (i9o5) 188 Mass. 595, 75 N. E. 68;
Evans v. City of Sheboygan (1913) 153 Wis. 287, 141 N. W. 265; Boise Dev.
Co. v. Boise City (1917) 3o Idaho, 675, 167 Pac. 1O32; see McQuillin, op. cit.
supra note 187, sec. 2623; see on this subject a valuable note in (192o) 34 HAIv.
L. REv. 66.
"Ashley v. Port Huron (1877) 35 Mich. 296; Ely v. St. Louis (1904) 181
Mo. 723, 81 S. W. x68; Fowler v. City of Cleveland (1919) 'oo Ohio St 158,
i26 N. E. 72; see 4 Dillon, op. cit. supra note 195, sec. 1735, note i. This is
sometimes expressed in the form that discretionary, i. e., legislative or judicial
functions, impose no liability, whereas those which are "absolute and perfect" or
merely ministerial, impose liability for negligence. Rochester White Lead Co. v.
Rochester (852) 3 N. Y. 463; City of Denver v. Kennedy (19o5) 33 Colo. 80;
8o Pac. 122; Johnston v. District of Columbia (1886) II8 U. S. ig, 6 Sup. Ct
923; Chicago v. Sebem (1897) 165 Ill. 371, 46 N. E. 244; ig R. C. L. io86,
note 3, and cases there cited.
City of Pass Christian v..fernandez (1911, Miss.) 1oo Miss. 76, 56 So. 329;
Ehrgott v. Mayor (1884) 96 N. Y. 264, 273; Wright v. Augusta (1886) 78 Ga.
241; Johnston v. Chicago (1913) 258 IIl. 494, ioi N. E. 96o, Ann. Cas. 1914B
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It is believed that not one of these alleged criteria or justifications
is sound, and that all of them can be found to have been denied validity
in decided cases. Pecuniary benefit to the tort-feasor has not been
regarded as a basis for determining tort liability, and recognition of
that fact is to be found in the many cases holding municipal corpora-
tions liable for various torts committed by firemen, health officers,
sewer inspectors, etc. The fact of agency is not normally determined
by the character of the service or function but by the control exercised
by the principal over the agent, and this fact again is recognized by the
many cases holding municipal corporations liable for the torts com-
mitted by drivers of garbage and ash carts, library delivery wagons, etc.
Just why public functions cannot be performed properly unless the
city is immune from responsibility for the torts of its officers is not
apparent. On the contrary, it might be more convincingly argued that
greater efficiency and justice would be attained by accompanying power
with responsibility, and if this does not induce greater respect for law,
it would at least respond more satisfactorily to a public sense of jus-
tice if losses inflicted on the individual by the wrongful acts of agents
of the community are spread over the community as a whole rather
than allowed to rest upon the unfortunate victim alone. The reason
assigned by Ashhurst, J. in Russell v. Men of Devon20 ' for holding a
county not liable for injuries resulting from a defective bridge, namely,
that "it is better that an individudl should sustain an injury than that
the public should suffer an inconvenience," is to-day no more palpably
immoral than the frequently uttered explanation that public moneys
raised by taxation for public uses cannot lawfully be applied to the
payment of damages caused by the wrongful acts of public officers.
20 2
An outraged sense of justice is probably responsible for such cleavage
with precedent as Fowler v. Cleveland, 2 " holding the city liable for
339. See also Hill v. Boston, supra, and 4 Dillon, op. cit. supra note 195, sec.
I643, i66o; (1912) 10 MIcH. L. REv. 306-310.
A definition of the distinction between governmental and corporate powers
which sought to combine several of the criteria just mentioned was essayed by
Judge Shipman in the case of Hart v. Bridgeport (1876, C. C. D. Conn.) ii
Fed. Cas. No. 6149, 13 Blatchf. 289. He there said:
"Public duties are, in general, those which are exercised by the state as a
part of its sovereignty, for the benefit of the whole public, and the discharge
of which is delegated or imposed by the state upon the municipal corporation.
They are not exercised either by the state or the corporation for its own
emolument or benefit, but for the benefit and protection of the entire population.
Private or corporate powers are those which the city is authorized to execute
for its own emolument, or from which it derives special advantage, or for the
increased comfort of its citizens, or for the well ordering and convenient regula-
.tion of particular classes of the business of its inhabitants, but are not exercised
in the discharge of those general and recognized duties which are undertaken by
the government for the universal benefit."
(1788, K. B.) 2 T. R. 667, 1oo Eng. Rep. 359.
'Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals (18Io) 7 Mass. 187; Coolidge v.
Brookline (1874) 114 Mass. 596; Hamilton County Commissioners v. Mighels
(1857) 7 Ohio St. lO9.
I(igi) ioo Ohio St. i58, z26 N. E. 72. See also Jaked v. Board of Education
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injuries inflicted by the negligent act of the driver of a municipal fire
engine, though respect for traditional formulas persuaded the court to
hold the act of returning from a fire to be- "ministerial." Nor is it
clear why a voluntary assumption of duty should lead to responsibility
in contrast to a duty imposed by law; such a principle would be
unique in the law. Its unsoundness would seem to be challenged by
the fact that a considerable number of cases come to the opposite con-
clusion.
20 4
The distinction as a basis for liability, between (i) determining
whether an act shall be done and (2) then acting upon and executing the
determination, has justification only to the extent that deliberation and
action as to policy is legislation and hardly an operative fact imposing
legal duties, and for the exertion of power in determining policies it
would therefore be inappropriate to predicate tort liability. On the
other hand, to impose tort responsibility in connection with acts per-
formed in execution of legislation would, if uniformly applied, do away
with most of the alleged distinctions between governmental and corpor-
ate functions and would make the city responsible whenever there was a
breach of legal duty running to the injured individual. This perhaps
is the soundest basis for predicating legal responsibility and would
render irrelevant a distinction between acts of omission and commission,
between nonfeasance and misfeasance, with which the English courts
in particular have been much concerned. 205  The important criterion
would be the existence of a legal duty running to an individual, and
the search for this legal relation would not predilde judicial empiri-
cism in the enlargement of the concept of legal duty and its divorce
from its existing rather mechanical fetters when dealing with the rela-
tion of the public to the individual.
The alleged distinction between acts beneficial to the public at large
and those beneficial to the city itself or the local community alone as
a test of liability seems devoid of substantial foundation. To find that
the building or operation of a drawbridge,206 the maintenance of a city
(1921, 3rd Dept.) 198 App. Div. 113, x89 N. Y. Sup. 697, aff'd 234 N. Y. 5!1 ;
NOTES AND COMMENTS (1921) 7 CORN. L. QuART. 176. The Fowler case has been
overruled by Aldrich v. City of Youngstown (1922) io6 Ohio St 342, 14o N. F_.
164, holding the city not liable for injury caused by a negligently driven police
patrol wagon.
See Bruce, C. J. in Moulton v. City of Fargo (1918) 39 N. D. 502, 510, 167
N. W. 717, 720: "There is no good reason why a, liability to a private action
should be imposed when a municipality voluntarily entered upon such a beneficial
work and to withhold it when it performs the service under the request of an
imperative law." See also Tindley v. City of Salem (1883) 137 Mass. 171 ;
Wixon v. Newport (1881) 13 R. 1.4.54; Jaked v. Board of Education, supra note
203; McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 187, sec. 2626. 1
'See article by W. H. Moore, Misfeasance and Nonfeasance in the Liability
of Public Officers (1924) 30 L. 'QuART REv. 276, 415.
' Daly v. New Haven (1897) 69 Conn. 644, 38 At. 397; Evans v. Sheboygan
(1913) 153 Wis. 287, 141 N. W. 265.
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hall and other municipal buildings, 20 7 driving an ambulance,20 8 main-
taining a city hospital,20 9 are for the general benefit of the public at
large, whereas cleaning the streets, 210 constructing sewers,211 maintain-
ing a city prison, 2 1 2 or driving an ash cart,213 are for the local benefit
seems an unconvincing distinction. It is, in fact, used merely as one
of the criteria to distinguish governmental from corporate functions.
In this respect, it is no more useful than several other of the criteria
already mentioned, and justifies the remark of" the Missouri court in
Young v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co :214
"The reasons given for liability and for non-liability of municipal
corporations, we admit, are not logical or consistent. Some of the
reasons given for non-liability will apply just as forcibly to cases where
liability is asserted and vice versa."
The fact is that all functions performed by a municipality are for
the public benefit, otherwise they could hardly be undertaken with
public funds or by public officers. And it would seem to make little
difference whether the group in whose name the officer acts or speaks
is large or small, or whether profit is derived from the undertaking or
not. Nor can we give serious consideration to the attempt of certain
courts to explain municipal exemption from responsibility for the torts
of officers in the performance of "governmental" acts or its so-called
police powers on the ground that illegal or unlawful acts of officers
in such cases are ultra vires and therefore incapable of rendering the
municipality liable.2 5  This discredited idea once had considerable
vogue on the continent in freeing all corporations from responsibility
for the torts of their agents, but it has long been discarded in most
civilized jurisdictions and its spasmodic revival can only be attributed
to insufficient analysis or carelessness.
When it is recalled that historically, so long as the forms of action
survived, nonfeasance was not trespass, 218 that no private action lay
against a town for breach of-a public duty, but the correct procedure
was by way of indictment,217 that subsequently the inability to sue for
failure to perform public duties was placed upon the lack of incorpora-
20 Schwalk's Adm. v. Louisville (1909) 135 Ky. 570, 122 S. W. 86o.
'Maximilian v. Mayor of New York (1875) 62 N. Y. 16o.
Tollefson v. Ottawa (19o7) 228 Ill. 134, 81 N. E. 823.
21 Young v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 1, 103 S. W. 135.
211 Ely v: St. Louis (19o4) 181 Mo. 723, 81 S. W. 168; Donohue v. Kansas City
(1896) 136 Mo. 657, 38 S. W. 571.
'Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas (i89i, C. C. W. D. Va.) 47 Fed. 268.21 Missano v. Mayor of New York (1899) i6o N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744.
21 (1907) 126 Mo. App. I, 103 S. W. 135.
2-City of Chicago v. Williams (1899) 182 Ill. 135, 55 N. E. 123; see infra.
"6 Six Carpenters Case (611, K. B.) 8 Coke 146a; i Chitty, Pleading (i6th
ed. 879) *191.
='Bro. Abr., Accion sur le case, pl. 93. This was to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
2 Inst. 701 ; Cro. Car. 365.
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tion 21--we have a sufficient historical explanation of the immunity of
cities and towns for failure to take legislative action, to enforce by-laws,
and even to abate certain types of nuisances, like coasting on the city
streets.219  But after incorporation had taken away the principal defense,
it would seem to require only the establishment of a positive duty
to the injured individual to justify the imposition of municipal lia-
bility for breach or negligent performance; so that the encrusta-
tion of the law with supposed distinctions between governmental and
corporate duties and the alleged criteria for determining the correct
classification are for the' most part unsound. Hence the confusion
among the courts in their efforts to work out a consistent system.
When it is recalled that every duty performed by the agents of the
corporation is designed to effect some community purpose, and if we
admit, as some courts or legislatures may generally be found to have
done, that there are very few of these duties the negligent performance
or breach of which to the injury of an individual may not result in
municipal liability, we may come to the conclusion that the mere
size of the group-city, county or state--on whose behalf the officer
acts, cannot and should not create a difference in principle. The
continental distinction between private and public functions of the
administration, whether of city, county or state, was largely for the
purpose of determining the applicability' of the rules of private
and public law, respectively, and it is only within recent years that
public law, reasoning by analogy from rules of private law, has been
found sufficiently elastic to impose group responsibility for the torts
of many public officers. But our difficulty has been to overcome the
belief that the relation of agency or respondeat supeiior could not
exist between the group and the officer when he was performing a
' See Thomas v. Sorrell (17o6, C. P.) Vaugh. 330, 340, 124 Eng. Rep. lo98,
1io4; see also Russell 21. Men of Devon (1788, K. B.) 2 T2 R. 667, 672, oo Eng.
Rep. 359, 362; Mower v. Leicester (182) 9 Mass. 247 (see editor's note question-
ing the applicability of Russell v. Men of Devon, because the town was incor-
porated) ; Bartlett v. Crozier (282o, N. Y.) 17 John. 439. These were all actions
for damages resulting from failure to keep a bridge or highway in repair. By
i788. in Russell v. Men of Devon, Kenyon. J., thought the common law had become
definitely established against an action by the injured individual against the inhabi-
tants. Ashhurst, J., announced the view, not deemed very sound, that "it is better
that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience." 2 T. R. 667, 673, ioo Eng. Rep. 359, 362.
' Thus the mere failure to furnish adequate fire or police protection, or main-
tain schools, hospitals, poorhouses or other public works could hardly impose legal
liability. Dillon, op. cit., secs. 1656, 1658, 166o; McQuillin, op. cit., secs. 2430,
2431, 2625, 2643, 2666, 2675 and cases there cited. So for failure to pass or enforce
ordinances. Rose v. Gypsum City (1919) 204 Kan. 422, 179 Pac. 348; McQuillin,
op. cit. sec. 2631 and cases there cited. See" also ig R. C. L. 2oo, and note
exceptional cases like Cohen v. New York (i889) 213 N. Y. 532, 22 N. E. 700,
which may be explained on the ground of negligence in maintaining the safety of
its streets. So for failure to abate nuisances, except on its own property; see 19
R. C:L. i o2 and cases cited.
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so-called governmental or public function. If this difficulty has been
to a considerable degree overcome, at least in principle and logically,
when the group is the city or incorporated town, there should not be
much difficulty in securing legislative permission to impose liability and
thus satisfy the demands of justice, when the group represented is the
county or the state. The historical anachronism which enables the
community, when organized as a county or state, to escape subjection
to the customary rules of law, should be repealed by a frank recogni-
tion of its unsoundness and injustice under present conditions.
In order not to leave the inconsistency and confusion of the courts
in applying the distinction between governmental and corporate duties
in the realm of mere assertion, it may be useful to discuss briefly the
judicial effort to apply the distinction to particular facts.
PROPERTY
To judge from a long series of decided cases, it might readily be
concluded that an injury to property receives much greater protection
from the law than an injury to the person; Whenever the city through
its council or governing body authorizes or ratifies an invasion of the
property rights of an individual, an action for the trespass seems to
lie.22 0  This often occurs in the negligent construction or operation of
public works or improvements.221 Yet if the state legislature
expressly or impliedly authorized the city to construct the public work
in the injurious way in which it was built-and usually only then-
the city will be able to shield itself behind the state's alleged impossi-
bility to commit or authorize a tort.222 The fallacy of this plausible
explanation, which would make every official wrongful invasion of
private rights ultra vires, has already been exposed. Nevertheless,
when the injury to the property is serious and direct-and lines here
are difficult to draw-the constitutional protection of the owner of
property against uncompensated "taking" for public use, aids him in
recovering from the city in an action sounding in tort.223  If the city's
public property is used so as to constitute a nuisance to private property,
the owner of the latter may recover as he would against any other
' Thayer v. Boston (1837, Mass.) i Pick. 511; Persons v. Valley City (1913)
26 N. D. 342, 144 N. W. 675, L. R A. 1916 D lO79; Forbell v. New York (19oo)
164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644.
'Langley v. Augusta (1903) 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486; Wilson v. Boise City
(1911) 2o Idaho, 133, 117 Pac. 115; Barrows v. Sycamore (1894) 150 Ill. 588,
37 N. E. lO96; 1g R. C. L. lo86, note o.
' Goszler v. Georgetown (1821, U. S.) 6 Wheat 593; Northern Transportation
Co. v. Chicago (1878) 99 U. S. 635; Sauer v. New York (19o4) 18o N. Y. 27,
72 N. E. 579, aff'd (19o6) 2o6 U. S. 536, 27 Sup. Ct 686; 19 R. C. L. 1087, note 4.
'Hickman v. Kansas City (1894) 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225; Swift v. New-
port News (19o6) 105 Va. l08, 52 S. E. 821. In these cases, it is assumed that
the legislature has not authorized a method of procedure under eminent domain
for the ascertainment and recovery of damages. Parish v. Yorkville (1913) 96
S. C. 24, 79 S. E. 635.
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private owner of land,224 but, curiously, if that same public property
thus used causes an injury to the person, recovery would be most
exceptional.225 Whether this difference can be satisfactorily explained,
as has been attempted, by the fact that the governing authorities acting
as the corporation are presumed to be aware of continuing nuisances,
whereas the defective condition of public property -causing personal
injuries is usually due to the negligence of some individual caretaker,
226
is more than doubtful. Professor Goodnow, who as early as 1895
sensed a growing'disposition of the courts to hold municipalities liable
for the negligent maintenance or management of public property,
explains the assumed exception to the ordinary rule of immunity by
stating that the duty to keep property under the control of the muni-
cipal corporation in a safe condition "is in all cases considered to be a
private, municipal or corporate duty." 227  Whether this thesis is sus-
tainable, except with respect to injuries to private property, or in
respect of such public property as is used for purposes of revenue, like
public markets, gas and water works and similar enterprises, is open
to question. Certainly many of the cases of the twentieth century, in
dealing with personal injuries arising out of the negligent management
of public property, such as city halls, hospitals, police stations, fire-
houses, etc., still seek to maintain the traditional distinction between
property used for "governmental" and for "6orporate" purposes, which
Professor Goodnow says, in the light of the disposition of some courts
to disregard the tradition, led to "a conflict in the decisions which is
absolutely irreconcilable."
It is when we come to injuries to the person that we find the courts
commonly invoking the distinctions between governmental and cor-
porate, even as to injuries sustained by the defective condition or
management of public buildings. Thus, the negligent operation of an
elevator in a city hall or other defective condition producing injury has
been held-though not uniformly-to exempt the city from liability
on the theory that a city hall is used for public and "governmental"
purposes .2 2  But when the city hall is rented out, at least in Massa-
' 4Valparaiso v. Moffitt (1894) 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N. E. 9o9; Aldworth v.
Lynn (89) i53 Mass. 53, 26 N. E. 229; Hines v. Rocky Mount (1913) 162
N. C. 469, 78 S. E. 51o; Johnson Co. v. Philadelphia' (1912) 236 Pa. 5IO, 84
At. 1o4; see White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations (192o) secs. I1O
et seq.
Brown v. District of Columbia (1907) 29 App. D. C. 273; Hill v. Boston
(1877) 122 Mass. 344; Wilcox v. Rochester (19o7) 19o N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. iig;
Shaw v. Charleston (1go6,) 57 W. Va. 433, 5o S. E. 527.
l See 1g R. C. L. O85. See note to Heller v. Smith (1922, Iowa) 188 N. W.
878, in (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 56, on alleged distinctions between nuisance and
negligence in the care of city streets.
Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule (1916) I5o et seq.
'*Snider v. St. Paul (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763; Schwalk v. City of
Louisville (igog) 135 Ky. 570, 122 S. W. 86o, 25 L. P. A. (N. s.) 88 (negligently
constructed or operated elevator). So with respect to elevator in federal post-
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chusetts, for private or even public purposes from which a revenue is
derived,229 though leased to the state for the use of its legislature,
2 3 0
the immunity is lost. Not so, however, the immunity of the state,
when it leases its armory for a private exhibition.23 1  The state can-
not like a city throw off its sovereign immunities by renting out its
public property, a distinction the layman will not easily grasp or the
lawyer easily explain.
Education being deemed a governmental state function, it has been
customary to exempt the city or board of education, regarded as
acting for the state, from liability for injuries resulting from the
defective condition of school buildings or the'negligence of persons
in charge thereof. 22  Yet even this conclusion is not unanimous, New
York dissenting vigorously ;233 and where the defective condition
constitutes a nuisance to other property, the usual rule of protecting
private property against nuisances is revived to impose liability on the
office building. Bigby v. United States (1903) 188 U. S.'400, 23 Sup. Ct. 468;
Eastman v. Meredith (x858) 36 N. H. 284 (cave-in of defective floor) ; Kelley v.
Boston (19o7) 186 Mass. 165, 71 N. E. 299 (snow and ice negligently thrown from
the roof) ; so in case of a negligently unguarded pit near the approach to a court-
house. Cunningham v. St. Louis (1888) 96 Mo. 53, 8 S. W. 787. But Illinois,
Pennsylvania and one or two other jurisdictions have come to the opposite con-
clusion, holding the city liable without attempting to make the traditional dis-
tinction between "governmental" and "corporate." Chicago v. Dermody (1871) 61
Ill. 431 and Chicago v. O'Brennan (1872) 65 Ill. i6o (falling roof or ceiling);
Fox v. Philadelphia (19o4) 2o8 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356 (negligent operation of
elevator in city hall); McCaughey v. Tripp (1879) 12 R. I. 449 (collapse of
improperly constructed part of building); White, op. cit. supra note 224, secs.
95 et seq.
' Oliver v. Worcester (1869) 3O2 Mass. 489; Worden v. New Bedford (I88I)
131 Mass. 23; Little v. Holyoke (i9oo) 177 Mass. 114, 58 N. E. 170.
'Lowe v. Salt Lake City (1896) 13 Utah, 91, 44 Pac. 1O5O.
'Riddoch v. State of Washington (1912) 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450, supra
note 26.
'Hill v. Boston (1877) 122 Mass. 344; Wixon v. Newport (i88i) 13 R. I.
454; Ernst v. West Covington (1903) 116 Ky. 85o, 76 S. W. io89; Folk v.
Milwaukee (igoo) 1O8 Wis. 359, 84 N. W. 42o; Kinnare v. Chicago (1898) 171
II1. 332, 49 N. E. 536, and cases cited in 25 L. k A. (w. s.) 89. As to hospitals
see Benton v. Trustees of the Boston City Hospital (1885) 14o Mass. 13, 1
N. E. 836; see (1923) 2 Wis. L. REv. 25o, and note 101, supra.
' Wahrmann'v. Board of Eduzcation (19o7) 187 N. Y.. 331, 8o N. E. 192;
Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York (1912) 2o7 N. Y. 2o3, ioO N. E. 8o6;
Kelly v. Board of Education (192o, Ist Dept.) 191 App. Div. 251, i8o N. Y. Supp.
796; Jaked v. Board of Education of Albany (1921, 3rd Dept.) 18 App. Div.
113, 189 N. Y. Supp. 697, aff'd 234 N. Y. 591, 138 N. E. 458; Van Dyke v. City
of Utica (1922, 4th Dept.) 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277; Herman
v. Board of Education (1922) 234 N. Y. x96, 137 N. E. 34; Williams v. Board
of Trustees (1922, 4 th Dept.) 204 App. Div. 566, 198 N.. Y. Supp. 476, (1924)
2o5 N. Y. Supp. 742; see 4 Dillon, op. cit., sec. 1658; (1922) 7 CORN L. QUART.
176. See also Powers v.-Philadelphia (x1oa) 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 621 and Rosenblit
v. Philadelphia (i9o5) 28 Pa. Super. Ct 587.
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city.2 34 Although school districts as governmental subdivisions of the
state are as a rule immune from responsibility in tort, a statute of Wash-
ington permitting counties, school districts .nd incorporated towns to
be sued for injury "arising from some act or omission of such county
or other public corporation" was construed, prior to the repeal of the
statute, to render the school district liable for injuries sustained from
a defective condition of a school building and its appurtenances. 235
Similar statutes have been construed to the precisely opposite effect
ifi Minnesota and Oregon; 236 in Washington we had the anomalous
result, prior to the repeal of the statute, that a school district was liable,
whereas a strictly municipal corporation was not, for injuries resulting
from defects or negligence in school buildings.- 2 7
In the case of buildings used as police stations, prisons or jails
there appears to be more than ordinary uniformity in considering the
building as a "governmental" agency, and on that account considering
the city immune from responsibility for injuries occurring therein
through negligence of municipal officers. Thus, negligence in leaving
open the door of an elevator shaft in a police station238 was deemed
to render the city immune, though the negligent employee was not
a policeman, and though there are cases which hold that in trans-
porting policemen from the station to their posts or beats, the city is
not performing a governmental function. 239  Only a few courts seem
to realize that policemen perform many functions not strictly police in
their nature, most courts being wedded to the theory that the act of a
police officer must be "governmental." Yet where a nuisance to
property caused by a police station or similar building can be worked
out, there is greater judicial disposition to allow the nuisance to sub-
merge the police causation of the injury and to hold the city liable,2 40 as
well as in some, though not all, cases where the nuisance, caused or
tolerated by the police, makes a street unsafe for travel and a person
'Briegel v. Philadelphia (18go) 135 Pa. 451, 19 Atl. io38; Miles v. Worcester
(I89i) 154 Mass. 5ii, 28 N. E. 676.
'Howard v. Tacoma School District, No. 1o (1915) 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac.
Ioo4. This statute was repealed in 1917 and the usual rule of immunity
re-established. Stovall v. School District (i92o) 1io Wash. 97, 188 Pac. 12, 9
A. L. P, 9o8.
'Bank v. Brainerd School Dist. (1892) 49 Winn. io6, 5i N. W. 815; West v.
School Dist. (i9iA) 68 Or. 474, I37 Pac. 749.
'See (I916) 4 CAin.F. L. REv. 254.
' Wilcox v. Rochester (19o7) i9o N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. I19, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.)
741. See the strong dissenting opinion of Haight, J. who. contended that trans-
porting policemen in the building is no different from transporting them out of
the building, and that there was no "governmental" or "police" function in having
a city employee, not even a policeman, run an elevator
'Jones v. Sioux City (1919) 185 Iowa 1178, 17o N. W. 445; (0919) 3 MINN.
L. REV. 359.
'Roth, v. District of Columbia (Igoo) 16 App. D. C. 323.
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is injured. Here the municipal duty to keep its streets in safe condi-
tion is deemed to outweigh the fact that the police caused the injury."'
The temporary care of persons under arrest or punishment may be
deemed incidental to the administration of justice, and hence govern-
mental in its nature. At all events, there seems to be unusual agree-
ment in relieving the city of liability to prisoners or others by reason
of insufficiently heated, unsanitary or negligently managed jails and
workhouses, 24 2 though even here there is not entire unanimity.
243
Negligently constructed or 'operated fire-houses have not often
been instrumental in producing injuries, yet the few cases dealing
with them have not resulted in uniform conclusions. In the case of
Kies v. City of Erie,244 recovery was allowed against a city for injuries
caused by the negligent construction of doors to a firehouse, which were
suddenly swung across the pavement, although the court added, in the
earlier consideration of the same case, that the city would not be liable
had the doors been negligently operated by a fireman, an artificial
distinction not easy to justify. Failure to repair the floor of a fire
station has in one case entailed municipal liability,245 whereas injuries
caused by falling through an unguarded hole in the floor of a fire-
house have in another case not involved municipal responsibility.
2 46
' Twist v. City of Rochester (igoo, 4th Dept.) 37 App. Div, 307, 55 N. Y.
Supp. 85o, aff'd 165 N. Y..619, 59 N. E. 1131 (contact of pedestrian with fallen
patrol wire belonging to city, used only by police department) ; Neuert v. City of
Boston (1876) 120 Mass. 338 (same with respect to wire used by fire department) ;
Hillsboro v. Ivey (1892) i Tex. Civ. App. 653, 20 S. W. 102 (negligence of city
marshal in removing carcasses of animals from street); Schinnick v. Marshall-
town (1908) 137 Iowa, 72, 114 N. W. 542 (plaintiff ran into rope placed across
street by police officer to stop travel) ; Carrington v. St. Louis (1886) 89 Mo. 2o8,
I S. W. 24o (plaintiff fell over door negligently open in street leading to a cellar
under police station). See also Kunz v. Troy (1887) 2O4 N Y. 344, IO N. E. 442
and contra: Altvater v. Baltimore (1869) 31 Md. 462.
"Gray v. Griffin (igoo) 111 Ga. 361, 36 S. E. 792; Kelley v. Cook (1898) 21
R. I. 29, 41 Atl. 571; Nichols v. Fountain (1924) 165 N. C. 166, 8o S. E. io5q.
See McKenzie v. Township of Chilliwack [1912, P. C.] A. C. 888; Bowling Green
v. Rogers (ig1) 142Ky. 55, 134 S. W. 921, and case noted in 25 L. R. A.
(N. s.) i8o, note; see also (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 164, and White, op. cit.
supra note 224, sec. I0O.
"Edwards. v. Pocahontas (1891, C. C. W. D. Va.) 47 Fed. 268; Moffitt v.
Asheville (1889) 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695; Shields v. Durham (1896) 118
N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794. The fact that statutes imposed the duty of keeping the
jail in a fit condition can hardly be deemed material in explaining.the departure
from precedent So-with defective court houses. Galvin v. New York (1889)
112 N. Y. 223, 19 N. E. 675.
24 (1895) 169 Pa. St 598, 32 Atl. 621, see also earlier case in (289o)
135 Pa. 144, ig Atl. 942. See also Mulcairns v. City of Janesville (1886) 67
Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565 (negligent construction of cistern for fire department, under
superintendence of employee not a fireman).
'Bowden v. Kansas City (904) 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573.
' Brown v. District of Columbia (29o7) 29 App. D. C. 273; cf. the conflicting
decisions of City of Lafayette v. Alick (i88i) 81 Ind. 166, where the city was
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Buildings used as municipal markets are not regarded as instrumen-
talities of "government," but as "corporate" enterprises, negligence in
the operation of which creates municipal responsibility.2417 A similar
position appears to be generally maintained by the courts with respect
to the negligent management of buildings used for municipal profit,
such as waterworks, gas works, electric lighting plants and municipal
washhouses,248 although there does not appear to be any sound reason
why these enterprises, often conducted at a loss, should be regarded as
having a status vitally different from those conducted in other public
buildings. It is of course plausible to assume that in performing these
functions the city is acting like a private corporation or individual, and
should be subject to the same rules of law, whereas in the administration
of its judicial, police, health, and fire departments it is acting as only
a government can, and this distinction has in fact on the continent
sustained the distinction in the application to community acts of private
law and resulting tort responsibility. It would be more just, how-
ever, were all public buildings, which after all are erected for com-
munity purposes, regarded as constituting a single class, the negligent
operation of which should impose liability as in the case of any private
building. Indeed, in a well-reasoned case holding a city liable for the
failure of a fire-marshal to repair the floor of a fire station,249 the dis-
tinction between governmental and corporate functions was expressly
repudiated, the court merely asserting that the duty was "public" and
was negligently performed to the injury of a private citizen and that
this was sufficient to invoke municipal responsibility.
(To be concluded)
held liable for the bui'sting of a defective boiler of a fire-engine, and Wild v.
Paterson (1885) 47 N. J. L., 4o6, i At. 49o, where the city was held immune
for injuries arising out of a defective brake on a fire-engine.
""Savannah v. Cullens (1868) 38 Ga. 334; Barron v. Detroit (1893) 94 Mich.
6ol, 54 N. W. 273; see White, op. cit. supra note 224, sec. 98.
"*Hand v. Brookline (1879) 126 Mass. 324; Henderson v. Kansas City (19o3)
177 Mo. 477, 76 S. W. 1O45 (waterworks); .Glase v. Philadelphia (1895) 169 Pa.
488, 32 Atl. 6oo (manhole in roof of pumping station, although roof used by
public as place of recreation); Kibele v. Philadelphia (x884) lO5 Pa. 41 (gas
works); Bulhmaster v. St. Joseph (1897) 70 Mo. App. 6o, aff'd 155 Mo. 58, 55.
S. W, 1o15 (electric lighting plant). Cowley v. Sutherland (i86i) 6 H. & N.
565 (washhouse). See also Toledo v. Cone (1884) 41 Ohio St. 149 (public
cemeteries); Seaman v. New York (i88o) 8o N. Y. 239 (public docks) ; Jones,
Negligence of Municipal Corporations (892) 71. Moulton v. Scarborough
(88o) 71 Me. 267 (animal on-poor farm permitted to run at large).
'Bowden v. Kansas City (904) 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573. So in the case of
Galvin v. New York (1889) 112 N. Y. 223, ig N. E. 675, a defective grating in a
municipal court house afforded a ground for liability, no mention being made of
the distinction between "governmental" and "corporate" functions. See also cases
cited in note 228 supra,
